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This article explores the impact of the likely levels of inaccuracy associated with two main types of 
premium estimation methods, under different sample sizes, on the actuarial performance of the US 
crop insurance program. The analyses are conducted under several plausible assumptions about the 
insurer versus the producers’ estimates for their actuarially fair premiums. Significant differences 
are found due to estimation method and sample size, with the currently used procedures resulting in 
the worse actuarial performance. Several conclusions and recommendations are provided that could 
markedly reduce the amount of public subsidies needed to keep this program solvent. 
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  Crop insurance is the most popular risk management tool used by U.S. agricultural producers. In 
2009, the U.S. crop insurance program covered close to 265 million acres, assuming nearly $80 
billion in liabilities. The Risk Management Agency (RMA) (please refer to the glossary at the end 
of the paper for a definition of all acronyms), a division within the US Department of Agriculture, 
administers this program. The traditional and most popular product offered by the RMA, which is 
the focus of this paper, is a farm level, multiple-peril, crop yield insurance policy (MPCI). This 
policy protects against low yield and crop quality losses due to adverse weather and unavoidable 
damage from insects and disease (Barnett, 2000). High participation has been achieved through 
large subsidies, with farmers as a whole now paying less than 50% of the total amount of premiums 
required to keep the program solvent (USDA/RMA 2010a). The need for substantial subsidies to 
achieve high levels of participation has in part been attributed to “adverse selection,” which is said 
to occur when the producers have more information about the risk of loss than the insurer and are 
thus better able to determine the fairness of the premium rates (Harwood et al. 1999).  
The perceived inability of the RMA to precisely estimate the actuarially fair premium that 
should be charged to a particular producer is a matter of concern. Because of its obvious linkage 
with crop insurance program performance, substantial research efforts have been conducted to 
improve rating procedures at the farm level (Glauber 2004; Carriquiry, Babcock, and Hart 2008; 
Anderson, Harri and Coble 2009; Rejesus et al 2010). Given the large disparities in program 
indemnities versus premiums observed across crops and regions (Glauber 2004; Babcock 2008) it 
appears that rating inaccuracy might be creating a problem at more aggregate levels as well. In 
addition to their impact on the actuarial performance of the crop insurance program, incorrect rates 
can affect the producers’ economic welfare and the incentives and returns to the private insurance 
companies that sell Federal crop insurance at those rates. 
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 A critical issue affecting premium estimation accuracy is the choice of the method used to 
model/approximate the underlying yield distribution. The three general procedures that have been 
proposed for this purpose are non-parametric, semi-parametric and parametric in nature (Ramirez, 
McDonald and Carpio 2010). The nonparametric approaches, such as those used by the RMA, are 
free of a functional form assumption and thus generally more flexible. However, they can be 
inefficient relative to parametric procedures under certain conditions. Specifically, according to Ker 
and Coble (2003), “it is possible, perhaps likely, for very small samples such as those corresponding 
to farm-level yield data, that an incorrect parametric form –say Normal– is more efficient than the 
standard nonparametric kernel estimator.” 
The parametric procedures assume that the data-generating process can be adequately 
represented by a particular parametric probability distribution function. Therefore, the key to their 
accuracy is that said distribution is flexible enough to closely approximate the stochastic behavior 
of the underlying random variable of interest (Ramirez and McDonald 2006). The main advantage 
of this method is that, if the assumed distribution can adequately represent the data-generating 
process, it performs relatively well even in small sample applications. Semi-parametric methods 
show significant potential because they encapsulate the advantages of the parametric and non-
parametric approaches while mitigating their disadvantages (Ker and Coble 2003; Norwood, 
Roberts, and Lusk 2004). 
Ramirez, Carpio, and Rejesus (2010) recently assessed the accuracy of select rating methods 
under different field conditions encompassing sample size, the number of farms from which data is 
available, and the level of yield correlation across farms. The rating methods evaluated by these 
authors include non-parametric historical loss-cost procedures that rely on indemnity data (similar 
to those currently used by the RMA) and flexible parametric methods which use simulations from 
estimated yield distribution models to compute the premiums. While it is recognized that there are 
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 other worthy procedures that could be considered, this article builds on their work to explore the 
impact of the likely levels of inaccuracy associated with these two particular premium estimation 
methods under different sample sizes, on the actuarial performance of the U.S. crop insurance 
program. The analyses are conducted under several plausible assumptions about the producers’ 
(versus the RMA) estimates for their true premiums, which is a critical issue that has not been 
addressed in previous literature either. Several conclusions and recommendations are provided that 
could substantially reduce the amount of public subsidies needed to keep this program solvent. 
Theoretical Framework 
A farmer participating in the Federal MPCI program selects one of several possible yield guarantees 
(   and some price guarantee level   . The expected value of indemnity   for coverage at the 
  100% of the mean (M) level of coverage is given by                           ,
  
   where 
   is the expectations operator and      the probability density function of yields. Knowledge of 
      is important for both the farmer and the insurer as they make their decisions to buy or sell a 
yield insurance product. For example, as shown in Coble et al. (1996) a risk neutral producer will 
only purchase yield insurance if       is higher than the premium charged. 
From the insurer’s perspective,       is the actuarially fair premium, i.e. the one it needs to 
charge to avoid an expected loss. Since       is unknown, it has to be estimated by both producers 
and insurers and, therefore, is subject to sampling variability. Additionally, given that the type, 
quality and quantity of information available these two parties are markedly different, the amounts 
of variability in their estimated       are also likely to differ. For the remaining of the paper, since 
the analysis is conducted from the insurer’s perspective, the actuarially fair premiums (      ) are 
also referred to as the true premiums (TP).  
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 Producer Behavior Scenarios 
 
The impact of farm-level premium estimation accuracy on crop insurance program performance is 
evaluated under the following scenarios: 
S1: The farmers are risk-neutral and know what TP is. Then, as explained in the theory 
section, individuals will not participate if the premium charged to them exceeds the TP. 
S2: The farmers are risk-adverse and know what the actuarially fair premium is. Then, 
theoretically, individuals will be willing to pay a risk-protection premium (RPP) for being 
insured. As a result, they will participate as long as the premium charged to them does not 
exceed TP+RPP. An admittedly high RPP of 25% is assumed. 
S3: The farmers are risk-neutral but do not know what the actuarially fair premium is with 
certainty. For this scenario, the farmers’ estimates of their true premiums are assumed to be 
unbiased and drawn from a normal distribution with mean TP and coefficients of variation 
(CV) of 0.5 (S3a) and 0.75 (S3b). Again, theoretically, individuals will not participate if the 
premium charged exceeds their estimate of TP. 
S4: The farmers are risk-neutral, do not know what the actuarially fair premium is, and their 
premium estimates are influenced by the insurer’s. Specifically, it is assumed that the 
farmers’ estimate equals TP+0.5xSEP, where SEP is the insurer’s estimate standardized to 
have a zero mean.  
S5: The farmers are risk averse (as in S2), do not know what the true premium is, and their 
estimates for it exhibit random error (as in S3) and are influenced by the insurers’ (as in S4).  
Methods and Procedures 
 
The question of how accurately can crop insurance premiums be estimated via the RMA procedures 
and other statistical methods was recently tackled by Ramirez, Carpio, and Rejesus (2010) through 
simulation analyses. Specifically, they identify five probability density function (pdf) shapes that 
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 are generally representative of farm-level corn yield distributions across the State of Illinois. These 
include a normal (N) and four non-normal densities characterized by: 1) low skewness (-0.833) and 
high positive kurtosis (396.654) (SUA), 2) low skewness (-0.09) and high negative kurtosis (-1.21) 
(SBA), 3) moderately negative skewness (-2.10) and moderately positive kurtosis (10.01) (SUB), and 
4) negative skewness (-2.77) and positive kurtosis (14.25) (SBB). They then consider those pdfs to 
be the true densities and use them to simulate yield datasets for their analyses. 
With this construct, the actuarially fair premiums (TP) can be computed with near-certainty 
on the basis of very large samples simulated from the “true” densities (Ramirez, Carpio, and 
Rejesus 2010, p 7-8). In addition, premium estimates can be obtained on the basis of small samples 
simulated from those same densities, and compared with the corresponding true premiums 
(Ramirez, Carpio, and Rejesus 2010, p 9-13). Through such comparisons, these authors assess the 
accuracy of various rating procedures under different conditions including sample size (SS) and the 
level of yield correlation across farms (CC). Three of their approaches will be considered in this 
research: 1) the two most accurate parametric methods identified by them (M1 and M2), and 2) their 
historical loss-cost procedure which mimics what is currently used by the RMA (M3) 
Specifically, the methods of Ramirez, Carpio, and Rejesus (2010) are used to generate a 
large number (2,500) of premium estimate values conditional on the underlying yield distribution 
(D = N, SUA, SBA, SUB or SBB), the estimation method utilized (M = M1, M2 or M3), the number of 
yield observations per farm (SS = 10, 25 or 50), and the level of correlation across farm yields (CC 
= 0 or 0.5). Note that those values are actually draws from the underlying distribution of estimated 
premiums associated with a particular D-M-SS-CC combination. As in Ramirez, Carpio, and 
Rejesus (2010) (equations 11 and 12), the 2,500 premium estimates obtained for each of such 
combinations are then used to compute two key statistics of the distribution: its Mean Absolute 
Deviation (MAD) and its average deviation or BIAS relative to the underlying true premium. 
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 Given the true premiums, for each of the previously described producer behavior scenarios, 
these 2,500 draws can also be used to compute the percentage of producers that would participate in 
the program (PPR) and the program’s Loss-Ratio (LR, defined as the ratio of the indemnities to be 
paid to the premiums to be collected) associated with various Premium Subsidy Rates (PSR, defined 
as one minus the percentage of the estimated premium (EP) that is actually charged to the 
producers). PSR is therefore the percentage of EP that is subsidized (i.e., paid) by the government. 
Under S1 (farmers are risk-neutral and know their actuarially fair premiums) if, for example, 
the distribution of premium estimates is symmetric and centered at the true premium (TP) and the 
PSR=0 (i.e., the producers are charged 100% of the estimated premium), only 50% of the farmers 
will face rates that are lower than what they know to be actuarially fair and thus participate in the 
program. As a result, the actuarially fair premium corresponding to all participating farmers will be 
more than or equal to what they are being charged, which means that the program will generate a 
net loss and have to be subsidized. In addition, the insurer would need to reduce (i.e., only charge a 
fraction of) its estimated premiums if it wants more than 50% participation, creating even larger 
total program losses. The producer participation rates and loss-ratios associated with various PSRs 
can be computed on the basis of the true premiums and the 2,500 draws from the probability 
distribution of the premium estimates associated with any particular D-M-SS-CC combination. 
Specifically, under this simplest scenario (S1), for each observation, the true premium (TP) 
is compared with the subsidized premium (SP), where SP is computed by multiplying the actual 
premium estimate (EP) times the fraction of it to be charged to the producer, which is one minus the 
Premium Subsidy Rate (PSR).  If TP>SP, the farmer participates in the program. Otherwise, he/she 
does not. The Producer Participation Rate (PPR) is then calculated by dividing the number of 
participating producers by the total (2,500), and the program Loss-Ratio (LR) is computed by 
dividing the sum of the true actuarially fair premiums (TP) by the sum of the subsidized premiums 
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 (SP) corresponding to the participating producers only. This process is repeated for PSR ranging 
from 0 to 99% in increments of 1%. A similar procedure is followed for the four remaining 
scenarios (S2, S3, S4 and S5), except that, instead of TP, SP is compared with: 
a)  1.25xTP for S2, 
b)  TP+CVxTPxZ (where CV = 0.5 and 0.75 and Z is a standard normal draw) for S3, 
c)  TP+0.5xSEP (where SEP is the insurer’s standardized premium estimate) for S4, and 
d)  1.15xTP+0.5xTPxZ+0.25xSEP for S5. 
For each scenario, the final output of this data-generating process can be captured in a 
9,000x15 matrix. This matrix is composed of 90 (100x15) sub-matrices containing the Producer 
Participation Rates and Loss-Ratios associated with each D-M-SS-CC-MAD-BIAS combination, 
for Premium Subsidy Rates ranging from 0 to 99%. The first 25 rows of the sub-matrix 
corresponding to M=M1, D=N, SS=10, and CC=0, which resulting distribution of premium 
estimates exhibits a MAD and BIAS of 7.391 and -0.111, is shown in Table 1. Note that the method 
and distribution type are coded as dummy variables. Also, as in Ramirez, Carpio, and Rejesus 
(2010), the MAD and BIAS are scaled in relation to a TP of 10. 
Models Specification 
Conceptually, note that in the first stage of the previously described data-generating process the 
characteristics of the distribution of estimated premiums (being summarized in the MAD and BIAS 
statistics) are jointly determined by the method used (M), the yield distribution assumed (D), the 
cross-farm yield correlation (CC), and the sample size (SS). In the second stage, those 
characteristics (MAD and BIAS) determine the Producer Participation Rate and the Loss-Ratio 
associated with any particular Premium Subsidy Rate. Econometric models are built to tease out the 
systematic components of these relationships. The first two models capture the relationships 
between MAD and BIAS and M, D, SS, and CC, as follows: 
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where Y is MAD or BIAS, M2, M3, D2, D3, D4, and D5 are dummy variables for methods 2 and 3 
and the four non-normal distributions (SUA, SBA, SUB and SBB), and i represents the observation. That 
is, the models include intercept shifters for method and distribution, linear and quadratic terms for 
CC and SS, and interactions between CC and method, CC and distribution, SS and method, SS and 
distribution, method and distribution, and CC and SS. 
  In regard to Producer Participation Rate (PPR), the Loss-Ratio (LR), and the Premium 
Subsidy Rate (PSR), an objective of this research is to be able to predict the LR that the government 
would have to incur in order to achieve a particular PPR given the characteristics (i.e., MAD and 
BIAS) of the probability distribution of the premium estimates. This means that a model for LR as a 
function of PPR, MAD, and BIAS is needed. After exploring several specifications, the following 
was sel d h i   at :  ecte  on t e basis of  ts higher adjusted R
2 and most significant parameter estim es
(2)                                                
          
           
   
                                                 /     
The problem with the above equation is that, as previously discussed, LR and PPR are 
jointly determined by PSR, MAD, and BIAS. Therefore, the following reduced-form model for PPR 
has to b im g ):  e est ated and the predictions from it (     ) used as an instrument for estimatin  (2
(3)                                                 
          
           
   
                                                 /     
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 Results and Discussion 
The models above are estimated for each of the five previously discussed scenarios (S1, S2, S3a, 
S3b, S4 and S5). Given the high level of non-linearity in the relations between the variables of 
interest, in order to improve functional form fit, the data used for estimation is restricted to PPRs 
between 20 and 95%, which reduces the number of observations from 9,000 to 4,656 (S1), 3,945 
(S2), 5,806 (S3a), 5,865 (S3b), 4,216 (S4), and 6078 (S5). Inferences beyond these PPR boundaries 
are not of empirical interest and will not be attempted. 
Summary statistics for these models are presented in Table 2. First, note that there is 
consistency in the magnitudes of the R
2’s for each of the models across all scenarios, ranging from 
0.830 to 0.858 for the MAD, 0.700 to 0.734 for the BIAS, and 0.805 to 0.945 for the PPR model. In 
the case of the Loss-Ratio models, which are the most critical for this research, the R
2’s are 0.941 
(S1), 0.935 (S2), 0.968 (S3a), 0.970 (S3b), 0.752 (S4), and 0.925 (S5). The relatively low value for 
the S4 model is attributed to increased noise generated when adding 0.5xSEP to TP. In general, 
however, these R
2 levels are impressive given that the models were estimated on the basis of at least 
3,945 observations each (i.e., there is no possibility of over-fitting the sample). In addition, most 
parameters are statistically significant across all models and scenarios, even at an α level of 0.001. It 
is evident that the independent variables, as well as their interactions, are important in explaining 
the observed dependent variable values. In short, the summary statistics presented in Table 2 
provide confidence on the predictions and inferences to be made from the models. 
  Given that the models are non-linear and include interaction terms, the best way to explore 
the responses of the endogenous variables of interest (LR and PPR) is through scenario analyses. 
Specifically, the estimated models are used to produce the statistics presented in Table 3. To create 
Table 3, MAD and BIAS are first predicted for each D-M-SS-CC combination of interest and 
averaged across the five distributions. The resulting MAD and BIAS predictions are then used to 
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 forecast the LR (equation 2) and solve for the PSR (equation 3) associated with a PPR of 75% in 
this case. It is also important to point out that in this scenario analysis, it is assumed that the status 
quo is the RMA-like method (M3) used with farm-level yield samples of size ten (SS=10) which 
exhibit a moderate 0.5 level of contemporaneous correlation with each other (CC=0.5). In fact, 
since the results are relatively similar for different CC levels and a moderate cross-farm yield 
correlation of 0.5 is the most likely field condition (Ramirez, Misra, and Field, 2003), only the 
statistics for CC=0.5 are presented and discussed. 
For the first scenario (S1), where it is assumed that the producers are risk neutral and know 
the true premium with certainty, Table 3 reveals several noteworthy trends. First, for the range of 
sample sizes evaluated (SS=10 to SS=30) the M2 premium estimates exhibit a substantially lower 
MAD and BIAS (i.e., are more precise) than M1 and M3. The reduced MAD and BIAS result in 
markedly lower program Loss Ratios. At SS=10, for example, the LR associated with the assumed 
75% PPR is 2.098 when M2 is used to estimate the premiums, versus 2.406 for M1 and 2.395 under 
the RMA-like historical loss-cost procedure (M3). It is interesting to note that although these figures 
are computed on the basis of estimated yield distributions representative of Illinois corn farms, the 
M3 LR of 2.395 is remarkably similar to the actual 1999-2009 nationwide average LR of 2.32 for 
the RMA’s MPCI plan (Table 5). 
The statistics in Table 3 can be extrapolated to obtain nationwide values and provide a 
general sense of the potential impact of using different methods and sample sizes for premium 
estimation on the performance of the US crop insurance program. At the 2009 MPCI indemnity 
levels of $1.265 billion, for example, the predicted status quo (M3, SS=10, CC=0.5) LR of 2.395 
implies that producers pay $527 million in premiums and the government has to subsidize the 
remaining $738 million. Alternatively, at the 2.098 LR associated with M2, $603 million in 
premiums would be collected and $662 million in government subsidies required. In other words 
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 government outlays could be reduced by approximately $76 million (10.3%) if M2 was used to 
estimate farm-level premiums instead of M3. 
A simpler way to assess the potential public cost differences is to compute the percentage of 
the total indemnities (i.e., of the program’s variable costs) paid by the government (PPG in Table 
3). In the previous comparison, the PPG associated with M3 is 0.583 versus 0.523 for M2, for a 
projected 1.265x(0.583-0.523) = 1.265x0.06  = 0.076 billion = $76 million reduction on the 
required government outlays. Larger (>0.075) PPG differences between M3 and M2 are observed at 
SS=20 and 30, which could amount to more than 1.265x0.075 = $95 million in public savings.  
The last column in Table 3 that deserves some attention is the Premium Subsidy Rate (PSR). 
As previously explained, PSR is the proportional discount that would have to be applied to the 
estimated premium in order to achieve the desired PPR, given SS, CC, and the premium estimation 
method utilized. As an example, when CC=0.5, SS=10 and M3 is used for premium estimation, 
PSR=0.411. This means that the estimated premium rates would have to be discounted/subsidized 
by 41.1% to achieve a PPR of 75%. At this subsidy rate, PPG=0.583, i.e., the government would 
end up paying for 58.3% of the total indemnity-related program costs. 
A second important conclusion from Table 3 is that there are substantial premium estimation 
and program cost efficiency gains that could be achieved by increasing SS.  This is a key result 
given the RMA’s current practice of limiting the maximum number of yield observations that are 
considered to establish the rates to 10 (USDA/RMA 2004). At the presumed status quo (M3, 
SS=10, CC=0.5), the estimated Loss-Ratio is 2.395 and the government has to underwrite 58.3% of 
the total indemnities paid, which extrapolates to a nationwide MPCI plan cost of 0.583x1.265 
billion = $737 million. As insurers collect longer, more reliable farm-level yield time-series, it is 
critical that they recognize the importance of exploiting this information. At SS=30, for example, 
M3 exhibits an LR of 1.930 and a PPG of 0.482, which would presumably reduce government cost 
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 to $610 million (i.e., by $127 million). If, in addition, the premiums were estimated using M2 rather 
than M3, the LR and PPG could further decline to 1.684 and 0.406, for potential public cost savings 
of nearly $223 million or approximately 30% relative to the status quo. 
However, the previously discussed figures rely on the assumption of a risk neutral farmer 
who knows the true premium with certainty (S1). These assumptions are relaxed next. The second 
scenario (S2) involves a risk-adverse farmer who knows the actuarially fair premium. Specifically, 
it assumed that he/she is willing to pay an admittedly high 25% risk-protection premium for being 
insured. Such a producer will purchase insurance as long as the premium charged does not exceed 
1.25xTP. As expected, program performance is much enhanced under this scenario, particularly for 
M2. At SS=30, for example, the M2 PPG declines to 0.217, versus 0.352 for M3.  
Although the actual risk-protection premium that a typical farmer is willing to pay for crop 
insurance is unknown, the previous result suggests that its magnitude could be a very important 
determinant of program performance. The actual magnitude of the RPP is obviously influenced by 
the fact that the federal government often provides disaster/hardship relief payments to farmers 
when an area’s crops are negatively affected by adverse weather or pest events. Therefore, 
substantial increases in the producers’ risk-protection premiums and reductions in the amounts of 
federal subsidies needed to keep this program solvent could be observed if the government credibly 
announced the elimination of all other forms of hardship relief payments and farmers had to rely on 
just crop insurance to cope with unusually high yield losses. 
The third scenario (S3) involves a risk neutral farmer whose estimate of the true premium is 
unbiased but subject to random error. The lower assumed CV of 0.5 (S3a) implies a MAD of 
approximately 4. This level of error was purposely selected to coincide with the MADs that are 
observed when the most accurate estimation method (M2) is used under SS=30 and CC=0.5 (Table 
3). In addition note that at such SS the BIAS in M2 premium estimation is negligible. In other 
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 words, the assumption underlying S3a is that the farmers’ estimates (FE) are as good as those 
obtained by optimal methods when a relatively large sample size is available. This assumption is 
justified by the fact that, in setting FE, the farmer considers his/her entire historical yield experience 
as well as that of other farmers with similar production systems and conditions, and he/she is better 
able than the insurer to ascertain what other farm operations are comparable to his/hers. 
Note that in S3a, the LR, PSR, and PPG statistics follow the same patterns as in S1 and S2, 
i.e. they decline with SS and are lower under M2. However, it is also observed that those statistics 
are noticeably higher at SS=10 and do not decline as quickly with increased sample size. This 
worsening trend continues at the higher CV of 0.75 assumed in S3b, which implies an MAD of 
about 6. At this level of producer uncertainty about what his/her actuarially fair premium is, the loss 
ratios remain at about 2.6 even when the insurer uses 30 yield observations to compute its premium 
estimates (M3), which means that the government has to subsidize about 60% of the total 
indemnity-related program costs (Table 3). 
In other words, uncertainty in the producers’ knowledge of the true premium substantially 
increases cost regardless of SS and reduces the benefits that could be reaped from the insurer using 
additional observations to estimate the premiums. This result negates the argument advanced in 
previous literature that poor program performance and the need for significant subsidies is in part 
due to the fact that the farmers have more information than the insurer about what the true premium 
is. Farmers having less information (i.e., S3 versus S1) in fact seems to make things much worse. 
An unrealistic scenario is explored to follow up on the previous result. In this scenario the 
insurer knows the true premium with certainty but the producer estimates it with error through the 
random process specified in S3. Since the insurer knows TP; M, SS and CC have no effect on the 
predicted LR, PSR, and PSG. At the lower CV of 0.5 (which implies a producer’s MAD of about 4), 
the LR is estimated at 1.52 and the government covers 34% of the indemnity-related program costs 
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 through a premium subsidy rate of 34%. At the higher CV of 0.75 (producer’s MAD of about 6), the 
LR, PSR and PPG increase to 2.1, 52% and 52% respectively. In short, producer error in premium 
estimation seems to have as much negative impact on program performance as insurer error. 
The fourth scenario (S4) also involves a risk-neutral farmer who does not know what the 
actuarially fair premium is. However, it is also assumed that his/her premium estimate is influenced 
by the insurer’s. Specifically, the producer’s estimate (FE) equals TP+0.5xSEP, where SEP is the 
insurer’s premium estimate scaled to have a mean of zero. This means that if the insurer’s estimate 
is X units above/below its average the farmer’s estimate will deviate from TP by half that amount. 
Adding 0.5xSEP to TP has the effect of increasing the overall correlation between EP and FE from 
0.25 to 0.70. Basically, as S1 and S2, S4 assumes that the farmer has better knowledge about TP 
than the RMA but, at the same time, he/she incorporates some of the information considered by the 
insurer (represented by SEP) on his/her premium estimate. 
The first part of this assumption has been previously justified. The second part is only 
reasonable if FE is strongly influenced by the observations from the farmer’s historical yield 
experience that are being used by the RMA to compute EP. Obviously, even if the insurer and the 
farmer consider the same yield data span to estimate the premium, their estimates are unlikely to be 
equal as their estimation “methods” are different. In addition, as previously argued, the producer is 
better able to ascertain which other farm operations are comparable to his/hers and will consider the 
yield experience of those other farmers to arrive to a subjective estimate of his/her TP. 
Nevertheless note that program performance is markedly improved under this scenario, 
particularity when SS=10. At the presumed status quo (M3, SS=10, CC=0.5), for example, the 
Loss-Ratio is 1.80 (versus 2.395 under S1) and the government only has to underwrite 44.4% of the 
total indemnities paid (versus 58.3%), for an extrapolated nationwide cost of $562 (versus $738) 
million. However, the improvement in program performance relative to S1 is much less at the larger 
14 
 sample sizes. This is likely due to the fact that the “base” correlation between EP and TP (and thus 
FE) increases with SS, which reduces the impact of the additional EP-FE correlation induced when 
making FE=TP+0.5xSEP. Regardless, anything that can be done to close the gap between FE and 
EP, such as educating farmers about the merits of the RMA’s premium estimation methods to 
increase their confidence on EP, could markedly improve program performance.  
The fifth scenario combines the features of the first four at arguably realistic levels. 
Specifically, the producer is assumed to participate in the program as long as the subsidized 
premium charged (SP) does not exceed his/her risk-adjusted premium estimate FE = (1.15xTP) 
+(0.5xTPxZ)+(0.25xSEP), which has an expected value of 1.15xTP, exhibits random error, and 
incorporates some of the information considered by the insurer in setting EP. Note that under this 
composite scenario and a target PPR of 75% (Table 3), the LR (1.93) and PPG (0.482) associated 
with the presumed status quo (M3, SS=10, CC=0.5) are on the low range of the reported 1999-2009 
annual averages for the APH-MPCI plan (Table 5). 
Marked differences in predicted program performance when using M2 versus M3 are also 
observed in this case, especially at SS=30, which suggest potential public cost savings of up to $60 
million/year. Increasing the number of observations used to estimate the premiums from 10 to 30 
substantially reduces projected government expenditures as well. Alternatively, at a target PPR of 
90% (Table 4), the LR (2.579) and PPG (0.612) are on the high range of what has been historically 
observed. Also note than having such a high target level of produced participation reduces the 
magnitude of the potential improvements in program performance due to premium estimation 
method and sample size, to about half of what it is observed at PPR=75%. 
A sixth scenario is composed after considering the previously discussed results which 
suggest that a high correlation between the producer and insurer premium estimates might be key to 
reducing program costs. Specifically it is assumed that, instead of using historical yield records to 
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 estimate the premiums, the RMA attempts to charge to the producers a premium amount that is as 
close as possible to what they (the farmers) consider to be actuarially fair. In a first sub-scenario 
(S6a) the producer estimates its own premium with random error (FE=TP+0.5xTPxZ, as in S3a) and 
the RMA assesses the farmer’s estimate with random error as well (EP=FE+0.5xFExZ). In this 
case, both the producer’s and the insurer’s estimates are unbiased but exhibit a MAD (PMAD and 
IMAD) of about four with respect to the true premium and to each other. Also note the implicit 
assumption that the producer is risk neutral, i.e. he/she does not assign a risk-protection premium to 
FE. Alternatively, this assumption would afford the RMA the luxury of underestimating FE by as 
much as the RPP.  
As expected, since EP is not based on the yield samples, the MAD, BIAS, LR, PSR and 
PPG statistics are the same regardless of SS, CC and method. In the case of S6a, these statistics 
suggest that 75% participation could be achieved with a PSR of about 26% and a LR of 
approximately 1.7. This means that the government would only have to pay for 40% of the 
indemnity-related program costs (Table 6), which is a substantial improvement over the status quo. 
An optimistic scenario (S6b) is that the insurer can more precisely estimate FE (FE=TP+0.5xTPxZ 
and EP=FE+0.25xFExZ, which imply MADs of about four for the producer and two for the 
insurer). This yields extremely favorable PSR (0.15), LR (1.29), and PPG (0.22) statistics. In 
comparison to the presumed APH-MPCI plan status quo (PPG=0.585 and program cost of $1.265 
billion), a PPG of 0.22 would save taxpayers (0.583-0.22)x$1,265 million = $460 million per year. 
If, in addition, the producers were willing to pay a 15% RPP, the PPG would further decline to 0.12 
generating savings of nearly $600 million. Interestingly, additional sub-scenarios provided in Table 
6 suggest that a higher MAD in the producer estimate for his/her true premium (holding the 
insurer’s MAD constant) slightly improves program performance, and increasing the target PPR 
from 75% to 90% does not hinder performance nearly as much as in the previous scenario (S5). 
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 In short, it appears that program performance could be substantially improved if the RMA 
could device a mechanism to elicit accurate estimates of what the producers believe their actuarially 
fair premiums are. The details on how this could be accomplished are left to future research. To 
finalize, it is noted that the rating aspects of the yield-risk component of the alternative Crop 
Revenue Coverage (CRC) plan, which augments the protection afforded to producers for price in 
addition to yield risk, are very similar to the APH. Therefore, the previously discussed qualitative 
conclusions and quantitative extrapolations should, to some extent, apply to it as well. Given the 
growing popularity of the CRC (Table 7), an enhancement in this program’s performance could 
save taxpayers as much as in the case of the APH-MPCI plan.  
Concluding Remarks 
The following remarks and conclusions are offered with the understanding that substantial 
extrapolations are being made from results obtained for a particular crop and state for which long 
and reliable farm-level yield time series are available. Such high-quality data is essential to reliably 
estimate the distributional shapes that are used as a basis for the analyses. Unfortunately, the authors 
do not have access to data of similar quality for other crops and states. However, as the necessary 
information is or becomes available, the methods and procedures introduced in this article could be 
replicated to obtain more reliable conclusions at the aggregate level. 
With this caveat, a first main conclusion of this research is that the current need to discount 
producer premiums in order to achieve substantial rates of producer participation, and the associated 
loss ratios and government subsidy levels, could be fully explained by the level of error in the 
RMA’s premium estimates at the farm level. In other words, in contrast to what has been suggested 
in the literature and public debate, the high program costs might not be due to poor program 
management, political influence to benefit particular constituencies or otherwise deliberate 
subsidies to some crops and regions. Also in contradiction to conventional belief, it is shown that 
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 the observed loss ratios and overall subsidy levels could occur without the programs being 
systematically subsidizing the less efficient farmers. Yet, random subsidies might be an unintended 
and unavoidable consequence of offering crop insurance as a safety-net for agricultural producers. 
The literature generally attributes the high loss ratios and indemnity-related program costs to 
a phenomenon called “adverse selection,” which is arguably caused by the fact that the farmers 
have more information than the insurer about what their actuarially fair premiums are. The results 
presented in this article suggest that this is not the case. In fact it is shown that, under the current 
rate-setting protocols, producer error in premium estimation could have as much of a negative 
impact on program performance as insurer error and that random uncertainty in the producers’ 
premium estimates on top of the insurer’s error actually makes things worse.  
A third important conclusion form this research is that  if the current protocol where the 
insurer attempts to estimate the actuarially fair premium based on observed yield data continues to 
be used, it is essential for the RMA to have more precise premium estimates for each of the 
producers that are or could be insured. The results suggest that the status quo could be substantially 
improved by using more elaborate methods as well as larger sample sizes for premium estimation, 
which is particularly key given the RMA’s current practice of limiting the maximum number of 
yield observations considered to establish the rates to 10. As longer, more reliable yield time series 
are available from participating producers and the RMA upgrades its premium estimation 
procedures, MPCI and perhaps CRC plan loss-ratios could potentially be reduced over time to the 
1.5-1.7 level, with the government having to subsidize only 35-40% of the program’s variable costs. 
Policymakers and taxpayers should realize that improvements beyond these levels could be 
difficult to achieve under the current strategy of estimating premiums based on yield samples. In 
addition, such LR/PPG levels might only be attainable at a moderate (75%) target producer 
participation rate. Under the current policy environment, larger loss-ratios might have to be 
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 permanently accepted if the goal is that a higher percentage of the producers voluntarily participate 
in the program. On the other hand, the results also suggest that the producers’ willingness to pay a 
higher risk-protection premium for crop insurance could drastically reduce the public program 
costs. Substantial increases in the farmers’ risk-protection premiums and resulting improvements in 
program performance could be observed if the government credibly announced the elimination of 
all other forms of disaster/hardship relief payments and farmers had to rely on just crop insurance to 
cope with unusually high yield losses. In addition, it is concluded that anything that can be done to 
close the gap between the producers’ and the RMA premium estimates, such as educating farmers 
about the merits of the RMA methods, could markedly improve program performance as well. 
A last but potentially promising conclusion of this research is that program performance 
could be substantially improved by completely changing the current RMA rate-setting strategy. 
That is, instead of attempting to estimate the true premiums based on observed yield data, the 
insurer could focus on eliciting the farmers’ willingness to pay for crop insurance, i.e. what they 
believe to be their risk-adjusted actuarially fair premiums for a particular plan choice. The analyses 
suggest that if these could be measured with reasonable accuracy, it might be possible to achieve 
very high levels of producer participation with loss ratios under 1.5. 
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February, 2010).  Table 1: First 25 rows of results sub-matrix corresponding to Method=1, Yield Distribution=Normal, SS=10, and CC=0. 
 
PSR  PPR  LR SS CC M1 M2 M3  N  SUA S BA S UB S BB MAD  BIAS 
0.00  62.72  2.50  10  0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0  7.391  -0.111 
0.01  63.12  2.50  10  0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0  7.391  -0.111 
0.02  63.36  2.51  10  0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0  7.391  -0.111 
0.03  63.64  2.52  10  0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0  7.391  -0.111 
0.04  63.96  2.52  10  0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0  7.391  -0.111 
0.05  64.28  2.53  10  0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0  7.391  -0.111 
0.06  64.64  2.53  10  0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0  7.391  -0.111 
0.07  65.28  2.53  10  0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0  7.391  -0.111 
0.08  65.60  2.53  10  0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0  7.391  -0.111 
0.09  65.92  2.54  10  0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0  7.391  -0.111 
0.10  66.32  2.53  10  0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0  7.391  -0.111 
0.11  66.92  2.53  10  0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0  7.391  -0.111 
0.12  67.36  2.53  10  0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0  7.391  -0.111 
0.13  67.68  2.54  10  0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0  7.391  -0.111 
0.14  68.04  2.54  10  0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0  7.391  -0.111 
0.15  68.60  2.54  10  0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0  7.391  -0.111 
0.16  68.76  2.56  10  0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0  7.391  -0.111 
0.17  69.16  2.56  10  0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0  7.391  -0.111 
0.18  69.80  2.55  10  0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0  7.391  -0.111 
0.19  70.00  2.57  10  0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0  7.391  -0.111 
0.20  70.28  2.59  10  0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0  7.391  -0.111 
0.21  70.60  2.61  10  0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0  7.391  -0.111 
0.22  71.08  2.61  10  0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0  7.391  -0.111 
0.23  71.56  2.61  10  0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0  7.391  -0.111 
0.24  72.12  2.61  10  0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0  7.391  -0.111 
0.25  72.56  2.62  10  0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0  7.391  -0.111 
 
Note: PSR=Premium subsidy rate; PPR= Producer participation rate; LR=Loss-ratio; SS=Sample size; Mi=Method i (i=1,2,3); SUA, SBA, SUB 
and SBB are the previously discussed non-normal distributions.
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 Table 2: Summary statistics for estimated models. 
 
Scenario 1 (S1: SP versus TP) 
Model Dep  Var  R
2  Tot # Par  NS α=0.001 NS  α=0.01 NS  α=0.10 
(1) MAD 0.849  31  3  2  1 
(2) BIAS 0.706  31  6  3  0 
(3) LR 0.941 11  0  0  0 
(4) PPR 0.875  11  1  1  1 
Scenario 2 (S2: SP versus 1.25xTP) 
Model Dep  Var  R
2  Tot # Par  NS α=0.001 NS  α=0.01 NS  α=0.10 
(1) MAD 0.858  31  3  1  1 
(2) BIAS 0.734  31  5  4  2 
(3) LR 0.935 11  2  1  1 
(4) PPR 0.805  11  0  0  0 
Scenario 3a (S3a: SP versus TP+0.5xTPxZ) 
Model Dep  Var  R
2  Tot # Par  NS α=0.001 NS  α=0.01 NS  α=0.10 
(1) MAD 0.830  31  3  3  2 
(2) BIAS 0.700  31  5  0  0 
(3) LR 0.968 11  2  1  0 
(4) PPR 0.932  11  1  0  0 
Scenario 3b (S3b: SP versus TP+0.75xTPxZ) 
Model Dep  Var  R
2  Tot # Par  NS α=0.001 NS  α=0.01 NS  α=0.10 
(1) MAD 0.829  31  3  3  2 
(2) BIAS 0.704  31  5  0  0 
(3) LR 0.970 11  1  1  0 
(4) PPR 0.933  11  1  1  1 
Scenario 4 (S4: SP versus TP+0.5xSEP) 
Model Dep  Var  R
2  Tot # Par  NS α=0.001 NS  α=0.01 NS  α=0.10 
(1) MAD 0.837  31  3  1  1 
(2) BIAS 0.705  31  5  5  3 
(3) LR 0.752 11  1  0  0 
(4) PPR 0.886  11  0  0  0 
Scenario 5 (S5: SP versus 1.15xTP+0.25xSEP+0.5xTPxZ) 
Model Dep  Var  R
2  Tot # Par  NS α=0.001 NS  α=0.01 NS  α=0.10 
(1) MAD 0.840  31  3  3  2 
(2) BIAS 0.702  31  4  2  1 
(3) LR 0.925 11  1  1  1 
(4) PPR 0.945  11  1  1  1 
 
Notes: The scenarios are as explained in the “producer behavior scenarios” section, Dep Var, Tot 
# Par, and NS stand for the dependent variable, the total number of parameters in the model, and 
the number of non-significant parameters at the given α. 
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 Table 3: Loss-Ratios (LR), Percentage Subsidy Rates (PSR), and Percentage Paid by 
Government (PPG), associated with CC=0.5 and various SS-M combinations and their 
corresponding MAD and BIAS statistics, for select scenarios (S1, S2, S3, S4, and S5) and a 
target producer participation rate (PPR) of 75%.  
 
 Scenario  1 
(SP vs. TP)    Scenario 2 
(SP vs. 1.25xTP) 
M SS MAD BIAS  LR  PSR  PPG M SS MAD BIAS LR  PSR PPG 
 
1 
10  8.451 2.919 2.406  0.388 0.584  
1 
10 8.530 3.000 1.959  0.307 0.489
20  6.315 1.714 2.102  0.379 0.524 20 6.388 1.800 1.705  0.256 0.414
30  4.690 0.837 1.830  0.330 0.454 30 4.791 0.973 1.459  0.175 0.315
 
2 
10  5.708 0.218 2.098  0.283 0.523  
2 
10 5.946 0.335 1.743  0.157 0.426
20  4.554 -0.114 1.840 0.252 0.456 20 4.666 -0.104 1.464 0.088 0.317
30  3.910 -0.119 1.684 0.241 0.406 30 3.930 -0.170 1.278 0.051 0.217
 
3 
10  8.757 3.478 2.395  0.411 0.583  
3 
10 8.894 3.604 1.943  0.334 0.485
20  6.766 2.199 2.148  0.404 0.534 20 6.818 2.231 1.743  0.286 0.426
30  5.286 1.248 1.930  0.361 0.482 30 5.287 1.230 1.542  0.205 0.352
 Scenario  3a 
(SP vs. TP+0.5xTPxZ) 
 Scenario  3b 
(SP vs. TP+0.75xTPxZ) 
M SS MAD BIAS  LR  PSR  PPG M SS MAD BIAS LR  PSR PPG 
 
1 
10  8.812 3.405 2.621  0.512 0.618  
1 
10 8.906 3.505 2.924  0.610 0.658
20  6.539 1.978 2.394  0.513 0.582 20 6.591 2.035 2.748  0.607 0.636
30  4.790 0.916 2.183  0.480 0.542 30 4.812 0.942 2.570  0.575 0.611
 
2 
10  5.759 0.261 2.378  0.417 0.579  
2 
10 5.796 0.297 2.717  0.515 0.632
20  4.556 -0.159 2.179 0.406 0.541 20 4.564 -0.153 2.555 0.506 0.609
30  3.876 -0.215 2.052 0.406 0.513 30 3.867 -0.226 2.446 0.504 0.591
 
3 
10  8.797 3.586 2.600  0.526 0.615  
3 
10 8.845 3.638 2.909  0.622 0.656
20  6.771 2.226 2.411  0.523 0.585 20 6.787 2.243 2.761  0.615 0.638
30  5.269 1.231 2.244  0.494 0.554 30 5.265 1.226 2.621  0.587 0.618
 Scenario  4 
(SP vs. TP+0.5xSEP) 
 Scenario  5 
(SP vs. 1.15xTP+0.25xSEP+0.5xTPxZ) 
M SS MAD BIAS  LR  PSR  PPG M SS MAD BIAS LR  PSR PPG 
 
1 
10  8.890 3.222 1.832  0.471 0.454  
1 
10 8.771 3.311 1.947  0.476 0.486
20  6.627 1.980 1.782  0.422 0.439 20 6.496 1.908 1.857  0.437 0.461
30  4.843 1.006 1.687  0.354 0.407 30 4.750 0.869 1.734  0.379 0.423
 
2 
10  5.747 0.342 1.782  0.296 0.439  
2 
10 5.809 0.263 1.874  0.328 0.466
20  4.616 0.070 1.659  0.268 0.397 20 4.587 -0.156 1.736 0.301 0.424
30  3.963 0.067 1.584  0.260 0.368 30 3.893 -0.211 1.641 0.295 0.391
 
3 
10  8.841 3.594 1.800  0.501 0.444  
3 
10 8.880 3.658 1.930  0.497 0.482
20  6.887 2.364 1.779  0.449 0.438 20 6.827 2.281 1.865  0.458 0.464




 Table 4: Loss-Ratios (LR), Percentage Subsidy Rates (PSR), and Percentage Paid by 
Government (PPG), associated with CC=0.5 and various SS-M combinations and their 
corresponding MAD and BIAS statistics, for scenario 5 (S5) for a target producer participation 
rate (PPR) of 90%.  
 
 Scenario  5 
(SP vs. 1.15xTP+0.25xSEP+0.5xTPxZ) 
M SS  MAD  BIAS  LR  PSR  PPG 
 
1 
10  7.341 2.512  2.552 0.657  0.608 
20  5.466 1.373  2.477 0.606  0.596 
30  4.121 0.600  2.385 0.553  0.581 
 
2 
10  3.971 0.062  2.347 0.510  0.574 
20  3.148 -0.091  2.268 0.493  0.559 
30  2.855 0.121  2.267 0.509  0.559 
 
3 
10  6.535 3.234  2.535 0.736  0.606 
20  4.881 2.120  2.483 0.676  0.597 




Table 5: Annual average performance statistics for the RMA’s Actual Production History (APH) 




Premium ($)  Subsidy ($)  Indemnity ($)  Loss Ratio  PPG 
2009 1,862,682,637    1,212,677,088 1,264,707,917 1.95  0.486 
2008 1,543,855,694  1,022,253,759 1,045,382,478 2.00 0.501 
2007 1,216,378,501  802,037,277 923,747,958 2.23 0.551 
2006 1,055,168,464  690,594,295 936,820,774 2.57 0.611 
2005 1,170,165,869  758,066,651 703,092,080 1.71 0.414 
2004 1,043,130,487  683,824,258 723,783,926 2.01 0.504 
2003 1,111,490,683  719,426,854 1,016,194,064 2.59 0.614 
2002 1,223,260,523  778,368,061 1,540,638,240 3.46 0.711 
2001 1,295,725,647  820,051,619 1,362,388,279 2.86 0.651 
2000 1,325,535,970  631,965,635 1,439,172,881 2.08 0.518 
1999 1,358,427,757  682,271,366 1,359,474,910 2.01 0.503 
Ave  1,291,438,385 758,885,978 1,119,582,137 2.32 0.551 
 




 Table 6: Loss-Ratios (LR), Percentage Subsidy Rates (PSR), and Percentage Paid by 
Government (PPG), associated with various Risk Protection Premiums (RPP) and Producer and 
Insurer MAD statistics (PMAD and IMAD) under the sixth scenario (S6). 
 
Sub-Sc  PPR RPP  PMAD  IMAD LR  PSR PPG 
6a  75%  0.00 4  4 1.67  0.26  0.40 
6b  75%  0.00 4  2 1.29  0.15  0.22 
6c  75%  0.00 4  6 2.16  0.35  0.53 
6d  75%  0.00 2  4 1.70  0.25  0.41 
6e  75%  0.00 4  4 1.67  0.26  0.40 
6f  75%  0.00 6  4 1.54  0.30  0.35 
6g  75%  0.00 4  4 1.67  0.26  0.40 
6h  75%  0.15 4  4 1.47  0.26  0.32 
6i 90%  0.00 4  2 1.38  0.26  0.27 
6j 90%  0.00 4  4 1.82  0.41  0.45 
6k  90%  0.00 4  6 2.30  0.52  0.56 
6l 90%  0.15 4  4 1.58  0.40  0.37 
 
Notes: Sub-Sc stands for Sub-Scenario, PPR is the desired Percentage Participation Rate, PMAD 
is the MAD of the producer’s estimate of his/her actuarially fair premium, and IMAD is the 









Premium ($)  Subsidy ($)  Indemnity ($)  Loss Ratio  PPG 
2009 4,367,572,316  2,645,518,256 2,190,463,687 1.27 0.214 
2008 2,219,011,108  1,257,088,180 1,972,654,193 2.05 0.512 
2007 1,874,783,620  1,049,065,786 1,165,147,323 1.41 0.291 
2006 1,417,938,583  798,189,879 1,267,734,894 2.05 0.511 
2005 1,002,323,347  564,234,738 482,229,181 1.10 0.092 
2004 1,326,218,311  752,374,551 946,584,025 1.65 0.394 
2003 1,023,468,000  586,583,591 1,089,071,338 2.49 0.599 
2002 854,004,399  475,059,665 1,507,694,149 3.98  0.749 
2001 1,228,983,610  677,450,847 1,159,592,000 2.10 0.524 
2000 908,387,353  366,906,473 805,199,750 1.49 0.328 
1999 727,761,996  354,636,053 798,400,704 2.14 0.533 
Ave  1,540,950,240 866,100,729 1,216,797,386 1.98 0.431 
 






Glossary of Acronyms 
 
APH: Actual Production History  MPCI: Multi peril crop insurance 
BIAS: Average difference between the 
estimated and true premiums 
PMAD: MAD of the producer’s estimate of his/her 
actuarially fair premium 
CC: Correlation coefficient PPG:  Percentage of total indemnity-related 
program cost paid by the government 
CRC: Crop Revenue Coverage PPR:  Producer participation rate 
CV: Coefficient of variation  PSR:  Percentage subsidy rate 
D: Distribution RMA:  Risk Management Agency 
EP: Estimated premium RPP:  Risk-protection premium 
FE: Farmer's estimate of true premium S:  Scenario 
IMAD: MAD of the insurer’s estimate 
relative to what the producer believes to 
be his/her actuarially fair premium 
SEP: Scaled insurer's premium estimate 
LR: Loss-ratio SP:  Subsidized premium 
M: Method SS:  Sample size 
MAD: Mean absolute deviation TP:  True, actuarially fair premium 
 